Enduring the Storm: Conscientious Objectors in the Persian Gulf War by Kuby, Ronald L. & Kunstler, William M.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 66 
Number 3 Volume 66, Fall 1992, Number 3 Article 6 
April 2012 
Enduring the Storm: Conscientious Objectors in the Persian Gulf 
War 
Ronald L. Kuby 
William M. Kunstler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kuby, Ronald L. and Kunstler, William M. (1992) "Enduring the Storm: Conscientious Objectors in the 
Persian Gulf War," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 66 : No. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol66/iss3/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
ENDURING THE STORM:
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR
RONALD L. KUBY AND WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER*
PROLOGUE
It is early spring, 1991, at the U.S. Marine Corps base at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and the hearing room is already
hot and stifling. The clippity-clap of helicopters landing and tak-
ing off next to the "courthouse" makes it impossible to open the
windows. Major Edward M. Healey, a fiftyish, balding, heavy-set
Marine has been designated as the investigating officer for a con-
scientious objector hearing. He knows nothing about conscien-
tious objection-he is neither cleric nor ethicist. His only two
qualifications are that he teaches legal writing at a local commu-
nity college and that he has no other duties at the present time.
Those of us who have been with Major Healey for the past
few days sense that he is becoming, well, unglued. For over an
hour, he has been cross-examining Lance Corporal Douglas De-
Boer as to whether a minister, who provided a letter attesting to
* Civil Rights attorneys Ronald L. Kuby and William M. Kunstler are New York-based
attorneys specializing in representation of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.
They are both affiliated with the Center for Constitutional Rights. Together with Steven
Somerstein of the law firm of Somerstein & Pike, Hillary Richard of the law firm Rabino-
witz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Melissa Ennen of the counseling organiza-
tion Hands Offi, and Michael Marsh of the War Resisters League, attorneys Kuby and
Kunstler formed a legal team that provided pro bono legal and counseling services to over
1,000 members of the Armed Forces objecting to the Persian Gulf War. Counsel wish to
thank Peter Graff, a second-year student at St. John's University School of Law, for his
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
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DeBoer's sincere opposition to war, had come to the DeBoer home
for "pizza events." DeBoer denies the minister's attendance at
"pizza events." The minister had been over to the family home,
for dinner, on many occasions, and they may have eaten pizza
during some of those dinners, says DeBoer. After all, the minister
has known the family for decades. DeBoer just won't admit
"pizza events." He does not even know what a "pizza event" is.
Neither do we. Nor do we understand what "pizza events" vel non
have to do with whether DeBoer has a firm and sincere opposition
to participation in war in any form. But Major Healey, the fact
finder, feels he is on to something here. He insists that the minis-
ter described the meetings in question as "pizza events." DeBoer
again proclaims his ignorance of the term. Major Healey is
plainly displeased. He looks like Arlen Specter cross-examining
Anita Hill. His lips pull tightly together, he shakes his head,
frowns, and drums the table, uttering an occasional humph. He
asks DeBoer whether he would object to adjourning the proceed-
ings so that the minister can be recalled as a witness on this
point. DeBoer, utterly baffled, agrees.
This is getting weird. Attorney Kuby, in a tone of voice and
with a demeanor reserved for unstable clients who have snatched
up writing implements and are fingering their sharp points, sug-
gests that maybe the Major did hear "pizza events." "Maybe the
minister said that he 'had been to the DeBoer home for dinner, to
eat pizza, events of that type... .' and that is why the term 'pizza
events' sticks in the Major's mind. There was a comma between
'pizza' and 'events,' but, of course, anyone would have heard it
'pizza events'. . . ." coos Kuby slowly and softly.
We never do find out why Major Healey thinks the "pizza
events" are significant. He adjourns the hearing. A few days later,
without explanation, he writes a one-sentence application to his
commanding officer asking to be relieved from the half-dozen cases
to which he has been assigned. The request is granted. A few weeks
later, Major Healey is quietly discharged from the Marine Corps
on medical grounds. We never see him again.
No one is reassigned to hear DeBoer's case. It does not matter.
The Marine Corps never had any intention of processing his claim.
Instead, DeBoer is charged with the crime of desertion for being
twenty-eight days late in reporting to his Florida drill site to com-
mence active duty. Denied an adjournment of the court-martial to
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finish the conscientious objector ("CO")' process, threatened with
five years in prison if he goes to trial, and having glimpsed the
system's workings, courtesy of Major Healey, DeBoer pleads guilty
in exchange for fifteen months in the brig. He receives a Bad Con-
duct Discharge ("BCD").2
DeBoer does not renounce his conscientious objector beliefs.
Now that he has been convicted, however, the Marine Corps will
not finish processing his conscientious objector claim. According to
the military's procedures, DeBoer cannot be a conscientious objec-
tor because he refused to fight. Only soldiers who obey orders can
become conscientious objectors.3
DeBoer becomes one of thirty-three persons designated by
Amnesty International ("AI") as "prisoners of conscience" in the
See 32 C.F.R. pt. 75 (1991). A conscientious objector is one who has a "firm, fixed and
sincere objection to participation in war in any form or the bearing of arms, by reason of
religious training and belief." Id. § 75.3(a).
2 See id. § 41.6(b). The Secretary of Defense defines discharge as a "[c]omplete sever-
ance from all military status." Id.; see also United States v. Scott, 11 C.M.A. 646, 647 (1960)
(requiring formal discharge certificate to terminate military status).
Various grades of discharge exist. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1991). An honorable
discharge is issued to members who have performed their required duties proficiently and
conducted themselves within the bounds of satisfactory military decorum. Id. A general dis-
charge under honorable conditions refers to an administrative discharge given to those
whose records do not warrant an honorable discharge because their performance is tainted
by some negative conduct. Id. Conversely, a discharge under other than honorable condi-
tions or an undesirable discharge may be issued for behavior that fails to meet accepted
military standards of conduct. Id.
The remaining two types of discharges, the BCD and the dishonorable discharge, are
punitive in nature and result only from a conviction by a court-martial. See EDWARD M.
BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 745, 748 (3d ed. 1982). A BCD has been defined as a type "of punitive
discharge ... [that] is designed as a punishment for bad conduct for an accused who has
been convicted repeatedly of minor offenses and whose punitive separation from military
service appears to be necessary." Id. at 745. A dishonorable discharge has been defined as
"[t]he most severe punitive discharge ... reserved for those who should be separated under
conditions of dishonor, or of offenses of a military nature requiring severe punishment." Id.
at 748.
3 See Government's Brief at 5, Lwin v. United States, 33 M.J. 666 (N.-M.C.M.R. 1991)
[hereinafter Lwin Brief] (citing Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan, vol. 1, annex
E, app. 8, 8(c) [hereinafter MOBPLAN]). According to MOBPLAN, "'Marine reservists
[sic] ordered to active duty must obey his orders unless his request for recognition as a
conscientious objector was received prior to the mobilization order.'" Id. Once a member of
the armed forces has been convicted of an offense and awarded either a Bad Conduct Dis-
charge ("BCD") or a Dishonorable Discharge, the military ceases processing the conscien-
tious objector claim. See Letter from Colonel J.R. Williams, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy
Inspector General, to Honorable Charles B. Rangel (July 3, 1991). (on file with author).
Motions by defense attorneys to hold up the court-martial so that the CO claim could
be processed to completion were opposed by military prosecutors and denied by military
courts.
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United States-the highest number of such persons since the war
in Vietnam.4
DeBoer's experience with the military's conscientious objector
and justice systems may be charitably characterized as bizarre, but
not atypical. During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 5 the
military engaged in a pattern of mistreating and harassing consci-
entious objector claimants, ranging from verbal abuse to physical
violence, from deploying them into the war zone to prosecuting
them by courts-martial.' This was true despite the fact that under
the military's own regulations, every member of the armed forces,
whether conscripted or enlisted, has an absolute right to apply for
discharge on the ground of conscientious objection.
The campaign against the conscientious objectors reflected the
military's deep concern about the potential for resistance from
within the ranks. During Vietnam, such resistance had a corrosive
effect on the morale of the armed forces and fueled anti-war senti-
' See Conscientious Objector Support Network, AIUSA, Table of U.S. Military Consci-
entious Objectors During the Persian Gulf War Adopted by Amnesty International As Pris-
oners of Conscience (1992) [hereinafter Al Table] (on file with author). According to
Michael Marsh of the War Resisters League, at least 75 conscientious objectors in the U.S.
Armed Forces were convicted of military offenses for refusing to participate in Desert
Storm/Shield and were sentenced to imprisonment. See Kimberly J. McLarin, For Resisters
Gulf War Continues, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1A. Amnesty Interna-
tional's smaller total reflects the fact that many resisters finished their incarceration before
AI became aware of their cases.
I Operation "Desert Shield" commenced shortly after the August 2, 1990 Iraqi incur-
sion into Kuwait. See Michael Drew & James Schwartz, The Brewing Confrontation, WASH.
POST, Jan. 15, 1991, at A14 (timetable of events leading up to and following Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait). The operation involved the deployment of about a half million members of the
U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf. Operation "Desert Storm" refers to the commence-
ment of hostilities by U.S., or "Allied," forces, on January 16, 1991. See David Evans &
Terry Atlas, U.S. Warplanes Attack Iraq, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1991, at C1.
6 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Epilogue to Gulf War: 25 Marines Face Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A14 (noting that Marine Corps was "harshest of all" in treatment of
CO applicants) (quoting Ronald L. Kuby); Kevin Carter & Laura Wenzel, Heroes Without
Weapons, THE PROGRESSIvE, Aug. 1991, at 16 ("Captain Francis Gaspar... told [CO] Lwin
he hoped other Marines would 'beat the shit out of him' for not going to Saudi Arabia.");
Michael Hovey, A Matter of Conscience, S.F. CHRON., June 14, 1991, at A27 (reporting re-
fusal of armed services to process CO claims until after applicants deployed to Gulf); Dean
E. Murphy, Unwilling Warriors' New Battle, L.A. TImEs, Apr. 24, 1991, at Al (reporting
that about 150 of 2500 CO applicants face court-martial proceeding and criminal prosecu-
tion); Bruce Shapiro, The High Price of Conscience, NATION, Jan. 20, 1992, at 50, 52
(Marine reservist CO George Ward was "repeatedly gouged ... with a razor . . . while
supposedly [receiving] a regulation haircut.").
I See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5 (1991). However, persons who volunteered for military services
must demonstrate that they were not conscientious objectors when they enlisted. Id.
§ 75.4(a)(1).
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ment in the general population. Even in the early days of Desert
Shield, GI resistance was providing the locus for anti-war groups
around the country.' And a public relations campaign of "support
our troops" could hardly be sustained if "our troops" were visibly
opposing the war. Accordingly, the military engaged in a concerted
effort to suppress and silence dissent within the ranks, while tak-
ing the public stance that such dissent was virtually nonexistent.
This campaign of suppression and denial was made possible
primarily because the entire conscientious objector process is
within the exclusive control of the military. The military defines
"conscientious objection," places the burden of proof on the appli-
cant,'0 appoints military officers to determine whether the appli-
cant is "sincere,"" and grants itself sole authority to determine
what will be done with the servicemember during the pendency of
his or her application.' 2
With few exceptions, the experience of conscientious objectors
during the Gulf War demonstrated that the military cannot be
trusted to treat conscientious objector applicants in a fair and im-
partial manner. It belies human experience to expect that those
who oppose a war will receive fair treatment at the hands of those
who are fighting it. Due process of law and fundamental fairness to
conscientious objectors became two more uncounted casualties of
the Gulf War.
I. NUMBERS GAMES: How MANY RESISTERS? WHAT TYPE OF
RESISTANCE?
A close look at the statistics maintained by the military
reveals a conscious effort to downplay the degree of opposition to
the war within the ranks. Military figures released to the public
8 Support committees quickly developed around individual refuseniks all over the
United States. See, e.g., David Gonzalez, Some in the Military are Now Resisting Combat,
N.Y. TINIEs, Nov. 26, 1990, at A13 (discussing support groups helping COs). The most suc-
cessful formed in New York City to defend Marine Corps resister Samuel Lwin, a student at
the New School for Social Research. The campus-based group, originally called "Hands Off
Sam!" provided legal and counselling services to hundreds of GIs around the country. See
Carter & Wenzel, supra note 6, at 16.
32 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (1991).
Id. § 75.5(d).
Id. §§ 75.5(e), 75.6(d). The officer is required, in a written report, to come to a "con-
clusion as to the underlying basis of the applicant's conscientious objection and the sincerity
of the applicant's beliefs." Id. § 75(d)(3)(iv).
12 Id. § 75.6(h).
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show that of the more than half-million soldiers mobilized as part
of Desert Shield/Storm between August 1, 1990 and July 31, 1991,
only 473 applied for conscientious objector status.13 Of these, the
military hastens to add, 270 have been approved, yielding an ap-
proval rate of 57 %. 14 These records have allowed the military to
argue a dual message-the number of resisters was minuscule-
(473 bad apples out of a barrel containing a half million) and even
these were treated with the scrupulous fairness one expects from
an institution whose mission is, after all, the protection of
democracy.
On the other hand, civilian experts who provided legal assis-
tance to GI's during the Gulf War claim that at least 2500 applica-
tions for conscientious objector discharge were actually submitted
to the military, a discrepancy of over 500%. 15
The difference is best explained by reviewing the military's in-
genious method of record-keeping. Like estimating the number of
Iraqi civilian dead, the military simply did not count the types of
casualties it did not want added to the tally. For example, the
Army, which contributed about 80% of the troops used in the Gulf
War, pioneered a clever method for reducing conscientious objector
applications-it prohibited soldiers from filing them. From August
1990, until January 2, 1991, Army regulations disallowed the filing
of conscientious objector applications until the soldier arrived at
his or her final duty station-Saudi Arabia."' The hundreds of
soldiers who prepared and submitted their applications while this
regulation was in effect were relegated to limbo and not counted in
the military tally of conscientious objectors.17
," See Robert L. Larsen, Jr. & Theodore G. Hess, Conscientious Objection in an All-
Volunteer Military, 66 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 687 (1992); see also David Wood, U.S. Army
Throws Book at Conscientious Objectors, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 4, 1991, at H6 (reporting
that 324 CO applications were adjudicated between October, 1990 and July, 1991).
14 Id.
15 See Murphy, supra note 6, at Al; Wood, supra note 13, at H6.
16 See Memorandum from Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C., to all Army Reps
and Activities (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter Army Memorandum] (on file with author). This
memorandum amended 2-10C(l) of Army Regulation 600-43 to read as follows: "A soldier
assigned or attached to a unit deploying to a new duty location ... may submit an applica-
tion for conscientious objector status[,] ... [which] application will not preclude the soldier
from deploying with his or her unit. The unit will process the application as operational and
mission requirements permit." Id.; cf. Louis Sahagun, Objectors' Sincerity Doubted, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at All (distinguishing procedure employed during Vietnam War pur-
suant to which soldiers seeking CO discharge remained in United States pending review of
request).
'7 See Wood, supra note 13, at H6. Although the Pentagon required "soldiers activated
[Vol. 66:655
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In addition, the Army's figures include only those applications
received by the Army Headquarters in Washington, D.C., while the
Marine Corps' figures count only those applications that have ar-
rived at the headquarters of the various Marine divisions. But ap-
plications for discharge on the ground of conscientious objection
are not submitted to headquarters-that is the last place they go.'$
Applicants must submit their claims to their unit commanders,
and there are a multitude of such separate commands in the armed
forces, located all over the planet. Once the commanders received
the applications, they exercised enormous discretion in dealing
with them-from throwing them into the trash can to recom-
mending a discharge on some ground other than conscientious ob-
jection. It was the rare application that made it to Washington.
The estimate of 2500 conscientious objector applicants seri-
ously understates the extent of anti-war sentiment within the mili-
tary. The definition of "CO'' 9 is so restrictive that few soldiers
could realistically hope for such status, even if the decision-making
process were a fair one. And the very filing of a conscientious ob-
jector application was a statement frequently viewed by the mili-
tary as an act of cowardice. 20 Only the most dedicated young peo-
ple chose such a route.21
Long after the war ended, the Pentagon admitted that more
than 8,000 members of the Armed Forces were declared absent
for Persian Gulf duty to withhold their CO applications until they arrived in the war zone[,]
.. . most officers understandably were too busy to process them." Id.
18 See Sahagun, supra note 16, at All.
Applicants are asked to provide written answers to 25 questions about training,
personal and religious beliefs and then submit them to their commander, along
with letters of support from friends and relatives. The applicant is scheduled for
separate interviews with a psychiatrist, a chaplain and an investigating officer. Fi-
nally, all paperwork related to the case is sent to Washington for final approval or
disapproval.
Id.; see also 32 C.F.R. § 75.6 (procedure for filing CO application).
10 See supra note 1.
10 See, e.g., Stipulation of Fact on Defense Motion for Unlawful Pretrial Punishment at
3, United States v. Summers, No. 593-26-6614 (Piedmont Jud. Cir. Court-Martial 1991)
[hereinafter Summers Stipulation] (on file with author) ("members of Legal Platoon were
referred to by troop handlers as conscientious objectors, deserters, [and] cowards.., both
privately... and in public"); Captain Ralph F. Miller, How Should Commanders Handle
Conscientious Objectors?, MAmiNE CoRPs GAzaEr, Feb. 1992, at 29 ("A Marine seeking re-
lief from this contractual obligation by conscientious objection conjures images that are any-
thing but sympathetic. Marines rightfully find this form of dissent distasteful.").
21 See, e.g., Amy Wallace, "The Hell Months": Conscientious Objector Recalls Marine
Reaction, L.A. Tnrms, June 9, 1991, at B1. As one CO, Marine Corporal Ken Turner, put it,
"[T]here were simpler ways to get [a discharge]." Id.
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without leave from October, 1990 to March, 1991. And at least
7,300 were still missing as of March, 1991.22 A desertion rate of
over 1,000 soldiers per month bespeaks of a military in crisis.
These "AWOLS" were able to avoid both military service and
the rigors of the conscientious objector process by simply taking
propitious vacations before their notice to report for active duty
arrived. These "refuseniks" were seldom prosecuted, as it was im-
possible for the military to show that they had actual notice of
when and where they were supposed to report. Conscientious ob-
jectors, on the other hand, were required to report for active duty
as a condition precedent to having their applications processed.23
For those who were late in reporting, the applications themselves
often contained statements sufficiently "incriminating" to permit
the military prosecutors to make out a claim of notice.24
Still others were able to avoid Persian Gulf duty by claiming
exceptions other than conscientious objector. During one weekend
in December, the Fourth Marine Division, responsible for all
30,000 members of the Marine Corps Reserve, received approxi-
mately 300 applications for discharge or exemption from the call to
active duty.25 These applicants cited every reason from medical in-
firmity to their own prior unsatisfactory service records in support
of these requests.26 In other words, on a single weekend, about 1%
of the entire Marine Select Reserve force sought to leave the mili-
tary or avoid service in the Gulf.
As the war progressed and the Reserve call-up expanded to
include members of the Individual Ready Reserve, each branch of
the military installed fax lines to handle the volume of requests for
exemption and discharge. The Air Force even went so far as to
install a toll-free number for refuseniks 27
The number of active duty personnel who engaged in some
22 See McLarin, supra note 4, at 1A.
22 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
" See Conscientious Objector Application of L. Cpl. John Henry Isaac III (Nov. 1990)
("Going U.A. [Unauthorized Absence] was the hardest thing that I have ever done.") (on file
with author); Conscientious Objector Application of L. Cpl. James E. Summers, Jr. (Nov.
27, 1990) ("I view Camp Lejeune as a stepping-stone to Saudi Arabia.") (on file with
author).
11 Statement of Duty Sergeant, Fourth Marine Division, office of the Staff Judge Advo-
cate, in response to telephone inquiry from author (Dec. 1990).
26 Id.
27 Conversation with David Stoler, Staff Military Counselor, Central Committee for
Conscientious Objectors (April 29, 1992).
[Vol. 66:655
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form of resistance to the war is impossible to estimate. Usually,
these incidents were handled at the unit level by commanders
whose intent was to resolve the problem quickly, without public
notice, and without general recognition by other members of the
unit. For example, one young African-American sailor who ob-
jected to fighting for the medieval Kuwaiti and Saudi monarchies
was informed by his commander that he would be assigned to
shore duties when his ship sailed-as long as he reported for duty
immediately and terminated his absent without leave, or AWOL,
status. The young man reported and remained in the United
States, and the incident of resistance is not reflected in any mili-
tary files.
II. WHO WERE THE OBJECTORS? WHY DID THEY ENLIST AND
WHY DID THEY RESIST?
The best profile of the Gulf War comes from examining the
thirty-three prisoners of conscience listed by Amnesty Interna-
tional-the young people who, when faced with a choice between
their military obligations and the demands of conscience, chose to
follow their Gods even into a jail cell.28 Of these thirty-three, al-
most all are from poor families. Nineteen are African-American,
Latino, or Asian.29 Thirty were low-ranking enlisted personnel;
only three were commissioned officers.3 0 Strikingly, twenty-six.
were reservists, rather than active-duty personnel.3 "
That the bulk of the resisters were members of the reserves
was a predictable result of the military's use of the "poverty
draft." Many reservists were recruited, at the age of seventeen or
eighteen, for weekend duty by the promise of a stipend for college,
some job training, and a tiny salary that meant the difference be-
tween welfare and self-sufficiency for many families.32 The Reserve
contract, an eight-year obligation, generally requires only one
20 See AI Table, supra note 4.
20 Id. at col. 1.
20 Id. at col. 2.
1 Id.
22 See Bruce Shapiro, Hell for Those Who Won't Go: Military Resisters, NATIoN, Feb.
18, 1991, at 194, 195 (for many recruits, "military represents the only ticket away from
poverty or a career at McDonald's"). According to Lance Corporal John Isaac III, "his re-
cruiter visited his drug-infested Harlem neighborhood offering a vision of hope, complete
with money for college and a sterling entry on an otherwise paltry resume. The recruiter
even treated the aspiring hospital administrator to a pizza after he agreed to an eight-year
contract." Murphy, supra note 6, at Al.
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weekend per month and two weeks of the year of drilling and
training. Most young people who join the reserves do so in order to
afford to be civilians.
For its part, the military is well aware of what motivates its
young recruits and shamelessly misleads them as to the nature of
their expected service.33 Recruits are not told of the military's ac-
tual plans for them in case of war.34 During the court-martial of
Sergeant David Bobbitt, a Marine reservist, Major Bruce War-
shawsky, a mobilization planner, acknowledged that recruiters sel-
dom talk about the prospects of war in "selling" the Corps:
Q. [I]s it not a fact that what you promote at the beginning
[are] virtues, rather abstract virtues in the telling, such as honor,
integrity, valor and wills of iron; is that correct?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And isn't it a fact that when . . . the Marine Corps dis-
cusses a Marine Reserve experience, they refer to making people
tougher, smarter, more confident and more determined; is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And they offer training at 200 technical schools and career
fields; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
33 See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 21, at B1. Describing the seduction of CO Ken Turner,
Amy Wallace writes,
When a friend who had joined the Army came home with a full wallet and a
new wardrobe, Turner was intrigued. He went to the recruiting office to inquire
about the Army. When the recruiter kept him waiting, Turner stepped into a hall-
way and was approached by a Marine.
"What do you want to get out of your life?" the Marine recruiter asked him,
displaying a set of flash cards. Turner picked the cards labeled Travel, Money and
Education, forgoing one that said Sense of Belonging to an Elite Group.
But, after the recruiter promised Turner filmmaking training in the Corps'
audio-visual program, Turner signed on for six years in the Quality Enlistment
Program. He completed boot camp in San Diego and was assigned to the School of
Infantry. The training, he said, was geared toward learning military rules and
technical skills.
Id.
Id See Testimony of Major Bruce Warshawsky, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve at 7, United
States v. Bobbitt, No. 100-64-9752 (Piedmont Jud. Cir. Court-Martial 1991) [hereinafter
Warshawsky Testimony]. Major Warshawsky admitted on cross-examination that the
Marine Corps' recruiting statements in promotional material do not mention "shooting peo-
ple" or "the casualty figures for Vietnam." Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 6, at Al (resist-
ers claim misleading recruiters "lured them to boot camp with the prospect of educational




Q. And amongst the various things they show people is how
to prepare dinner for a thousand; isn't that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And even when discussing an assault vehicle, it's done in
the context of learning skills like engineering and construction
that translate easily into the right qualifications for top-notch oc-
cupations; isn't that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Nothing about killing people, is there?
A. No, sir, not that I can recall.35
Indeed, recruiters often told young reservists that they would not
be called for active duty service unless there were an actual attack
on the United States. 6
Military recruiters also lied to young people about the mean-
ing of conscientious objection.3 7  During one court-martial, a
Marine recruiter admitted that he spent five years misinforming
people about the definition of CO. 3' He testified that he would tell
young people that if they were slapped and hit back, they were not
conscientious objectors. 9 His "example" was completely wrong and
directly contradicted the military's own regulations:
Q.... When you read the Marine Corps order on conscien-
tious objection, did you read, "[t]hat a willingness to use force to
protect one's self, home or family is not considered inconsistent
with a conscientious objection's [sic] participation in wars?"
A. Yes.
311 Warshawsky Testimony, supra note 34, at 8.
36 Michael Marsh of the War Resisters League reports having heard this from at least
ten reservists during the Persian Gulf war. Conversation with Michael Marsh in New York
City (April 19, 1992). Under contract law, this type of recruiter fraud provided a basis to
void the enlistment contract. See United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134, 137 (C.M.A. 1975)
(holding fraudulent enlistment void under common law contract principles). In 1979, Con-
gress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide that any member of the
service who is mentally competent and of lawful age, and who accepts a paycheck and par-
ticipates in some form of military activity has "constructively enlisted," irrespective of the
fraudulent inducement. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(c) (1983); see also United States v. Quintal, 10
M.J. 532, 535 (A.C.M.R. 1980) (noting that Congress rejected Russo doctrine by adding sub-
section (c)). Obviously, this did little to discourage recruiter fraud.
37 Prior to enlistment, every prospective member must swear that he or she is not a
conscientious objector. See Testimony of First Sergeant Carl B. Smith at 144-45, U.S.
Marine Corps, United States v. Summers, No. 593-26-6614 (Piedmont Jud. Cir. Court-Mar-
tial 1991).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 145.
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Q. Okay. And did that tell you that in fact the test for consci-
entious objection is not whether you slap somebody and he slaps
you back? That's not the test.
A. That's an example that I used.
Q. Okay. But that's an example that is specifically belied by
what you read in Marine Corps orders; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. But, nonetheless, you used that example . . .
anyway?
A. Correct.40
Of course, most young people, at the time of their enlistment,
a priori believed that they would fight in whatever military ven-
ture the United States embarked upon. But a lot can change, and
should change, between the teen years and young adulthood.
Twenty-three-year-old Stephanie Atkinson, an Army private from
Carbondale, Illinois, told 20,000 anti-war demonstrators in New
York that she enlisted when she was seventeen in order to obtain
money for college.41 And she took the money and went to college.
"I learned something in school," Atkinson said. "I learned . . . I
won't fight in the Persian Gulf."42 Responded Atkinson to her crit-
ics, "What do you want, that every 18-year old who joins up stay at
exactly the same level of political and moral understanding for the
rest of his or her life? '43
Indeed, in the civilian context, we would hail this maturation
process. As a society, we hope that a young person of seventeen,
who sees the world in black and white, accepts violence as a natu-
ral part of life, and believes that his or her point of view is the only
correct one, will change into a thoughtful young adult, who realizes
that no one holds a monopoly on right and wrong, and that shoot-
ing people is not an appropriate way to solve problems. But in the
40 Id. at 150 (quoting Marine Corps Order 1306.16E, enc. 1, at 1 (Nov. 21, 1986), ex-
cluding such action from definition of "war in any form").
4 Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, How to Conscientiously Object to the Gulf
War, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 15, 1991, at 23.
42 Id.
" Todd Ensign, Military Resisters During Operation Desert Storm/Shield, reprinted
in CYNTHIA PETERS, COLLATERAIJ DAMAGE (1992). Atkinson failed to report for duty when
ordered. See Sahagun, supra note 16, at All. After 17 days AWOL, she was arrested at her
home by a state trooper and spent a week in prison. See Dan Stets & Marie McCullough,
Jail Holds No Fears for U.S. "Refuseniks", TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 1991, at C7. Atkinson
was reported to police by citizens of her home town in Illinois, who called her "a criminal, a
traitor, [and] a coward." Id. Ultimately, the Army chose to give her an administra-
tive-"other than honorable"-discharge in lieu of court-martial. Id.
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military, such a transformation is viewed with suspicion.
As they matured, many resisters began to perceive contradic-
tions between what they were training to do in civilian life and
what they were training to do in the military. Typical in this re-
gard was Lance Corporal John H. Isaac, III, an African-American
Marine reservist from a poor family in Harlem. After waiting for a
full day in a ghetto hospital emergency room to get help for his
sick mother, Isaac went to school to study hospital administration.
As he explained during his court-martial, while he kept studying
ways in which to heal the sick, the Marine Corps was teaching him
to kill more efficiently. When the time came, he chose jail over tak-
ing someone else's life."
Another Marine reservist, Private Marquis Leacock, was an
emergency rescue technician, with seven "saves" to his credit. He
became a conscientious objector once the reality of his military
"job" became clear to him. On weekends, Leacock loaded artillery
for practice drills in the woods. One day, he loaded a defective
round that exploded prematurely, seriously wounding his com-
rades. For the first time, Leacock witnessed what such ordnance
actually did to human beings. According to the Navy Chaplain who
was assigned to his case, "[a]fter this accident he was and is totally
horrified at the thought of injuring any other human being, even
by accident.... These thoughts are enveloped in his Christian reli-
gious training and belief. '45 The Chaplain went on to note that the
Marine in question, "since entering the military, thoughtfully and
diligently evolved a belief and ethical stance that precludes his
participation in war of any kind. '46
For another young resister, his developing Christian beliefs
gradually became incompatible with his continued military service.
Lance Corporal Demetrio Perez, the son of migrant workers, began
a "fellowship" with members of the Mennonite community after
the death of his mother. After years of study with the Mennonite
brethren, Perez was ready to accept membership into the church,
which required resigning from the military. Wrote Perez:
"I See Murphy, supra note 6, at Al. Isaac was court-martialled for desertion and given
a Bad Conduct discharge. He served six months at hard labor in the Marine Corps brig. He
has been financially unable to return to college.
"1 REPORT OF CHAPLAIN J.S. LINEBACK, LCDR, CHJC, USN (Jan. 10, 1991).
16 Id. Leacock was court-martialled for desertion and given a BCD. He served six
months at hard labor in the Marine Corps brig and was subjected to sexual assault while in
custody. He has since returned to college.
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By the hand of the Lord I have been led to the Mennonite
Church, a truly [G]od fearing, Christ loving brotherhood with
whom I am seeking membership. After prayer and the develop-
ment of convictions I feel truly it is God leading me .... The
book of our heavenly [Flather clearly states we cannot serve two
masters.... I cannot bear arms, aid, or abet the use of violence in
any kind of war. I do respect and love my country for the freedom
and liberty we have under God.47
Perez's sincerity was attested to by two Mennonite bishops, every
lay worker who had ever met him, a Navy Chaplain, and the
Marine Corps Captain assigned to hear his case.48
These vignettes, illustrating the complex development from
adolescence to adulthood, received predictably little understanding
from the military. Lieutenant Colonel John B. Atkinson summed
up the prevailing view among prosecutors that the "motivating fac-
tor for these individuals is not deep-seated religious or ethical con-
viction, but rather . .. cowardice. '49
III. THE MILITARY'S CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR SYSTEM AND ITS
PECULIAR WORKINGS DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM
The right to claim conscientious objector status is a right ex-
clusively of military creation. The military is free to define "consci-
entious objection" in any manner it chooses. Not surprisingly, the
definition is so narrow as to exclude almost everyone, including
Christ and most of the Apostles, from its ambit. Pursuant to 32
C.F.R. § 75.3(a), conscientious objection is defined as: "A firm,
fixed, and sincere objection to participation in war in any form or
the bearing of arms, by reason of religious training and belief." 50
The most limiting aspect of this definition is that the objector
must oppose all wars in all forms-those that have ever been
" Conscientious Objector Application of Lance Corporal Demetrio Perez, Jr. (Nov. 27,
1990).
" Perez was convicted of desertion, given a BCD, and served six months at hard labor
in the brig. Upon his release, he was accepted into membership of the Mennonite Church.
See generally Marla Donato, Mennonites Thrust into Spotlight, War Leads to Calls About
Conscientious Objector Status, CH. TRm., Jan. 23, 1991, at 8 (indicating that Mennonite
Church has long history of "pacificism and quiet resistance").
4 Applebome, supra note 6, at A14.
32 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (1991); see also supra note 1 (further breakdown of CO defini-
tion). Part 75 of volume 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs all military person-
nel and reservists. Id. § 75.2.
[Vol. 66:655
ENDURING THE STORM
fought and those that might ever be fought.51 This definition auto-
matically excludes from consideration all those who follow the
"just war" doctrines of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas,
and the Catholic Church.5 2 Indeed, the very invocation of the con-
cept of "just war" as part of the applicant's belief system insured
that the application would be denied.5 3
Ironically, some of the most patriotic young soldiers-those
whose love of country would have led them to defend the nation in
case of actual attack-were faced with the choice of either lying
about their beliefs or admitting them and being denied conscien-
tious objector status. A young person who refused to participate in
a war undertaken for aggression, economic gain, or territorial ex-
pansion is denied conscientious objector status if he or she would
pick up a gun to repel a Nazi invasion of his or her hometown.5 4
The military places the burden of proof on the applicant by
clear and convincing evidence.5 And the person who must be
clearly convinced is, in first instance, a commissioned officer.5 6
51 See id. § 75.5(b)(1); see also Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F. Supp. 920, 927 (D. Mass.
1969) (denying CO application because objection was not to "war in any form" but only to
Vietnam War).
12 See COMMONWEAL, June 14, 1991, at 387, 388.
Thus, in an April 25, 1991, letter to President George Bush-who had argued
that the Gulf War was "just" by just-war standards-thirty-three Catholic bishops
asked the president to provide legal recognition of selective conscientious objec-
tion based on the just-war teaching. Logic would hold that if the nations [sic]
leaders accept the just-war theory as a standard for determining the legitimacy of
particular wars-as the president did in this case-individuals who do not believe
the war meets those standards should have the right to refuse a call to serve. In
fact, morally, they would be obliged to do so.
Id. Compare William V. O'Brien, Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
797 (1992) (applying just war criteria to Gulf War and finding them satisfied) with Gordon
C. Zahn, Ethics, Morality, and the Gulf War, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 777 (1992) (reaching
opposite conclusion).
"3 See Gordon C. Zahn, Prisoners of Conscience, U.S. Style, AMERICA, Nov. 16, 1991, at
360, 361 (noting that claims of many service personnel and reservists who based their objec-
tions on concept of "just war" "were rejected as 'selective' objection").
11 Cf. Rosenfeld v. Rumble, 515 F.2d 498, 499 (1st Cir. 1975) (CO status denied after
applicant admitted he would take up arms against foreign nation crossing territorial bound-
aries to kill Jews); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (CO must be opposed to
all war).
1 See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(d) (1991). The applicant "must establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence: (1) That the nature or basis of his claim comes within the definition of and
criteria prescribed herein for conscientious objection, and (2) that his belief in connection
therewith is honest, sincere and deeply held." Id. But see H.R. 5060, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) (proposing to amend chapter 53 of United States Code title 10); infra notes 125-43
and accompanying text (in-depth look at H.R. 5060, supra).
"I See 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(d) (1991). The conscientious objector process is a cumbersome
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Commonly, Investigating Officers ("IOs") avoided any discus-
sion of the Gulf War during the hearings, and instead focused
upon hypothetical wars, asking the applicant to become a time-
traveller or citizen of another nation. One young Marine Corps re-
servist of Lithuanian ancestry was asked whether it was immoral
for the Lithuanians to resist, by force, the then-ongoing Soviet
suppression of the Lithuanian independence movement. Appli-
cants were frequently asked whether they would have fought
Hitler, even if by so doing they could have saved the Jewish people
from genocide. A naval medical officer, whose sister was in the
Army, was presented with a detailed hypothetical in which she was
asked to assume that the United States had been invaded, her sis-
ter wounded in combat and in need of medical care. Would she
have provided medical care to her sister if it meant that her sister,
system, with layers of bureaucracy, that seldom can be navigated without the aid of an
attorney or civilian counsellor. See, e.g., Leonard v. Department of the Navy, 786 F. Supp.
82, 88-89 (D. Me. 1992) (detailing procedural aspects of CO application). The applicant first
submits a detailed application, in a prescribed format, to his commanding officer. 32 C.F.R.
§ 75.6 (1991). The application must contain essay answers that explain, inter alia, (1) the
applicant's belief system and why it is incompatible with military service; (2) how this belief
system arose; (3) when it became incompatible with the military; and (4) when and under
what circumstances the applicant believes the use of force is proper. Id. § 75.9(b). The ap-
plicant should supply letters of reference attesting to his or her sincerity. Id. § 75.9(d). The
rest of the process is solely within the control of the military. See id. §§ 75.6, 75.7.
Each applicant is required to undergo an interview by a military psychiatrist, id. §
75.6(c), presumably to insure that this unwillingness to kill is not a product of treatable
mental illness. Next, the applicant is interviewed by a military chaplain who is to engage in
a critical examination of the applicant's views. Id. There is no requirement that the chaplain
be of the same religious faith as the applicant. Id. The scheduling of these interviews is
within the discretion of the unit commander.
The applicant's commanding officer is then required to appoint another officer, of the
rank of Captain (in the Army and Marines) or Lieutenant (in the Navy and Coast Guard),
or higher, to serve as an Investigating Officer ("10"). See, e.g., MCO 1306.16E(6)(d) (Nov.
21, 1986) (requiring Marines' 10 to have rank of Captain or higher). The 10 is to hold an
informal "hearing" or interview with the applicant. 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(d)(2) (1991). The hear-
ing is supposed to be nonadversarial. Id. The applicant is entitled to counsel only at his or
her own expense-military lawyers are not provided. Id. § 75.6(d)(2)(i). The 1O is required
to prepare a report and recommend that the application be approved or denied. Id. §
75.6(d)(3). There are no time limitations on this process. The report is served on the appli-
cant, who must submit a rebuttal "within the time prescribed by the military service con-
cerned." Id. § 75.6(d)(3)(vi).
Following this initial phase, the application and report are submitted up the "chain of
command," with officers of progressively higher rank adding their own opinions as to
whether the application should be granted or denied. See id. § 75.6(e).
From there on, the individual branches of service have different requirements. As a
general rule, however, the entire packet is supposed to end up on the desk of the Secretary
of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, or the Commandant of the Marine Corps. See id. It is that
individual who has final discharge authority. See id. § 75.6(f).
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upon regaining health, would continue to participate in war?
These types of inquiries had a pervasive air of unreality. They
were geared to ignoring the actual facts of the actual war that the
objector was being called upon to fight, addressing hypothetical
situations in which the striking of a single blow would result in
unmitigated good and the staying of one's hand would create cata-
clysmic disaster. The, purpose of such questions was not to engage
in a neutral examination of the applicant's views, but rather, to try
and get the resister to admit that under some conceivable circum-
stance, some act of war might be proper, so that the application
could be denied.5 7
The applicant capable of surmounting the "war in any form"
hurdle still had to demonstrate that his or her objection was
grounded in religious training and belief.58 The case law and the
military's own regulations take an expansive view of the term "reli-
gious" in order to prevent the military reviewers from using their
own private religious beliefs as a gauge.5 9 "Ethical" and "moral"
objections, not based upon a belief in God, have been held to be
the functional equivalent of a "religious" objection." Nonetheless,
military authorities used their own, highly personal views of reli-
gion in making this assessment. For example, General J.E. Living-
ston, the Commanding General of the Fourth Marine Division, rec-
ommended disapproval of one conscientious objector application
because the applicant, raised in a Catholic family, "did not cite
examples from the lives of Jesus Christ or the saints of the Roman
Catholic Church as examples of living in peace."81 General Living-
ston ignored the fact that the young applicant repeatedly cited Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. as the religious leader who most pro-
foundly affected his views on war and peace.2
V See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing denial of CO status unless
applicant opposes war in any form).
See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(c) (1991).
See, e.g., Hager v. Secretary of the Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449 (1st Cir. 1991); MCO
1306.16E(5)(c)(3) (Nov. 21, 1986) ("Particular care must be exercised by individuals
processing applications not to deny the existence of bona fide beliefs that are incompatible
with their own."); Naval Military Personnel Manual, § 1860120(2)(b) (Jan. 1986) ("Religious
training and belief does not limit beliefs to traditional religious convictions .... [D]eeply
held moral or ethical beliefs ... also qualif[y].").
00 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Commanding General J. E. Livingston, Second Endorsement, Private, First Class
Carl C. Mirra, 064-64-2836/0351, United States Marine Corps Reserves, at 8 (Aug. 27, 1991)
[hereinafter Livingston Recommendation].
62 Conscientious Objector Application of Carl Christopher Mirra (Dec. 3, 1990) (on file
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With respect to the same application, General Livingston
noted that the reservist was a "belligerent Marine who missed
drills, was disrespectful of superiors, and was not beyond lying to
get out of his Marine Corps commitments .... [H]is belligerence
was part of his deliberate strategy to disrupt an organization whose
mission he believed was wrong."63 He concluded that such "behav-
ior belies the solid religious or moral foundation necessary to sup-
port a bona fide CO application. '64 General Livingston's determi-
nation that conscientious objection must be accompanied by
pleasant obeisance to those at whom one's objection is directed
surely would have disqualified everyone from Mahatma Gandhi to
Jesus Christ from conscientious objector status.
The third hurdle facing the applicant was proving sincerity.
6 5
There was a certain poignancy in watching young people, just out
of adolescence, attempting to convince career officers that they re-
ally believed it was wrong to kill somebody. And again, the mili-
tary did no better in making these determinations. For example,
one 10 recommended that nine conscientious objector applicants
be denied such status because they filed for discharge after "Iraq
invaded Kuwait, the entry of the armed forces of the United States
in that war, and the potential activation of his unit."66 This recom-
mendation was a wholly impermissible basis on which to deny a
claim. Every court to consider the question has "universally" held
that "late crystallization of conscientious objector convictions is
not a sufficient basis in fact" for rejection. In fact, courts have
long recognized that the imminence of one's participation in war is
often a catalyst for the crystallization of conscientious objector be-
liefs. Almost two decades ago, the Ninth Circuit summed up the
with author).
3 Livingston Recommendation, supra note 61, at 8.
6Id.
6 See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(d) (1991); see also Hager v. Secretary of the Air Force, 938 F.2d
1449, 1454 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Armstrong v. Laird, 456 F.2d 521, 522 (1st Cir. 1972))
(requiring that conscientious objection be sincere); Lobis v. Secretary of the United States
Air Force, 519 F.2d 304, 306 (1st Cir. 1975) (same).
6 Memorandum of Col. Frank A. Tauches, Jr., United States Marine Corps Reserve, to
Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, Reviewing Conscientious Objector Appli-
cations of Sgt. David Bobbitt, Cpl. Keith Jones, L. Cpl. Maung Maung Lwin, L. Cpl. Way-
mon McWhite, L. Cpl.- Robert Calabro, L. Cpl. Carl Christopher Mirra, L. Cpl. Kenneth
Chin, L. Cpl. Joseph Lucas, and Pfc. Colin Bootman.
67 Hager, 938 F.2d at 1455 (citing Lobis, 519 F.2d at 304); see also Shaffer v. Schles-
inger, 531 F.2d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 1976) (adhering to assemblage of cases holding that timing
of CO application is insufficient to support finding of insincerity).
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lessons of both law and life by noting:
Each level of Army consideration was pinned to the timing of
[the] application. Each officer inferred that a claim of crystalliza-
tion based on receipt of orders could not be sincere. Yet, human
experience repeatedly contradicts the inference: We again and
again fail to decide what we think about a situation until we must
confront it. Recognizing this reality, we have held that crystalli-
zation of conscientious objector views upon receipt of orders to
Viet Nam is not an indicium of insincerity.68
But the military's exclusive control over the process made such
holdings irrelevant.6 9
IV. THE COST OF CONSCIENCE: REPRISALS AGAINST
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
The popularity of the War, its short duration, and the nature
of the military itself insured that Gulf War resisters would be the
object of reprisals. Indeed, reprisals represented the universal ex-
perience of the Gulf War COs. 0
A. Deployment to the War Zone
The general practice of the Army and the active-duty Marine
divisions was to deploy the conscientious objector applicants to the
Gulf,7 1 where their applications were ignored until the war ended.
08 Richmond v. Larson, 476 F.2d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
See 32 C.F.R. § 75.4(b) (1991) (providing that head of service will make final decision
on individual basis); see also supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Judicial recourse is
available for improper denials of applications through habeas corpus. See, e.g., Leonard v.
Department of the Navy, 786 F. Supp. 82, 87-88 (D. Me. 1992) (habeas corpus relief granted
when denial of CO application had no factual basis); Hager, 938 F.2d at 1451 (applicant
petitioned for writ of habeas corpus after denial of CO application); Shaffer, 531 F.2d at 127
(same); Lobis, 519 F.2d at 305 (same). This was not a practical solution for Desert Shield/
Storm COs because of the extraordinary length of time the military took to finally decide
the CO claims. For example, a number of Marines who submitted their applications in No-
vember and December of 1990 are still awaiting final action by the Marine Corps at the time
of this writing. Cf. Murphy, supra note 6, at Al (Pentagon figures suggest 12 CO applica-
tions still pending, but anti-war groups claim number is higher). No case with which the
authors are familiar took fewer than five months from the time the application was
submitted.
70 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at Al ("[C]onscientious objectors complained that
they have been treated with less regard than Iraqi prisoners of war."); Wallace, supra note
21, at B1 (Marine and wife recount psychological harassment that made Marine feel "like a
loser ... totally disgraced ... like he was nothing").
71 See Hovey, supra note 6, at A27 (many went AWOL to prepare their claims); Wood,
supra note 13, at H6 (describing CO who was sent to Saudi Arabia in shackles).
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This, too, was accomplished by a subversion of existing military
regulations governing the treatment of conscientious objectors.7 2
In a kinder and gentler time, military planners had recognized
that the COs were apt to be the target of improper treatment, and
a regulatory mechanism was put in place to prevent commanders
from forcing objectors into situations where they would have to
chose between disobeying orders and following their conscience."
Typical was Marine Corps Order 1306.16E, which provided
that upon filing an application for conscientious objector status,
"[u]ntil a final decision is made.., every reasonable effort will be
made to assign applicants to duties within the command that con-
flict as little as possible with their beliefs."74
The clear and salutary purpose of the Order was that all per-
sons claiming CO status would be treated as such, until a decision
was made as to their status.75 Yet this Order was uniformly con-
strued by military commanders to permit deployment of conscien-
tious objector applicants-with their gear, weapons, and units-to
Saudi Arabia. 7 The military saw no conflict between conscientious
objection and sending an armed soldier into a combat zone.77
Indeed, as noted earlier, members of the Army were pre-
cluded, until January 2, 1991, from filing their conscientious objec-
tor applications until they arrived in Saudi Arabia.78 Following
months of protests by human rights organizations, the Army
changed that regulation for one that sounded better, but had the
same effect. 79 The amended regulation allowed the applicant to file
72 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing Army tactic of mandating
deployment while CO application pending).
" See 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(h) (1991) (instructing service to make every effort to assign
applicants with pending CO claims to duties conflicting as little as possible with their as-
serted beliefs).
7, MCO 1306.16E(6)j) (Nov. 21, 1986). Each branch of the service had a similar
provision.
71 See id. The military had the option of processing the applications swiftly to prevent
malingering by persons falsely claiming CO status.
76 See supra note 71; see also Wallace, supra note 21, at BI (Marine's request for
transfer to unit not being deployed while CO application pending was denied).
7 The Army was particularly creative in deciding what duties presented a minimum
conflict with the objector's views. One commander, leading a unit into ground combat in
Kuwait, forced an objector to remain with the combat unit and to carry a rifle. The rifle,
however, had the firing pin removed.
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
7 Army Memorandum, supra note 16 (amending Army Reg. 600-43, 2-10C(1)). If a
soldier receives an order for reassignment to a unit that is about to be deployed, he or she
may not submit a CO application "until he or she arrives at the new permanent duty sta-
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for conscientious objector status at any time and anywhere, but the
site at which the application would be processed would be within
the discretion of the commander.80  Nothing had
changed-conscientious objectors were shipped to Saudi Arabia.
Those unwilling to obey orders were forcibly chained and shackled
and placed on military aircraft.8 ' The Marine Corps' attempts to
do likewise almost started a race riot in one case, where white
Marines were ordered to attack a black Muslim conscientious ob-
jector and drag him to the troop bus."2
For those who had not yet completed their applications by the
time of deployment, little work could be done upon them after ar-
rival in Saudi Arabia. 3 Cut-off from their attorneys and civilian
advisors, unable to contact colleagues to obtain needed letters of
reference, and informed that no one was leaving until the "job"
was done,84 the Saudi desert proved to be a poor environment in
which to apply for discharge.
Those who had submitted their applications before landing in
Saudi Arabia fared no better. The exigencies of the war made it
impossible to conduct the requisite psychiatric, chaplain, and 10
hearings. Commanders were too busy to look for officers who could
be relieved of their regular duties and act as 1Os. No personnel
were available to compile and process the reams of CO paperwork,
then to ensure they were shipped back to the United States. Not
surprisingly, the Army does not keep any statistics as to how many
conscientious objector hearings were held in the Persian Gulf.
B. Prosecution of Conscientious Objectors
The most pernicious reprisal against conscientious objector
applicants was the decision that any breach of the Uniform Code
tion." Id. (amending Army Reg. 600-43, T 2-10C(2)).
8o See id. (CO application processed "as operational and mission requirements
permit").
a' Cf. Stets & McCullough, supra note 43, at C7 (U.S. medic stationed in Germany
went AWOL, but Army "finally clapped him in hand irons and shipped him off to war
against his will"); Wood, supra note 13, at H6 ("U.S. Army Private ... went to war... with
his wrists locked tightly together and his ankles shackled with 18 inches of steel chain.").
82 The unit deployed without the conscientious objector. He was court-martialled,
served nine months in the brig, and received a Dishonorable Discharge.
:' See, e.g., Hovey, supra note 6, at A27 (reporting inability of CO applicants to process
their applications once they arrived in war zone); Wood, supra note 13, at H6 (same).
84 See supra note 83. Rotations of troops between the United States and Saudi Arabia
did not occur until after the war ended.
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of Military Justice ("UCMJ") would be treated as a major felony,
prosecuted at general court-martial. This policy was created and
most tenaciously pursued by the Fourth Marine Division, responsi-
ble for the reserves. Although Fourth Division Marines numbered
only 30,000-about 6% of the troops mobilized for the war-70%
of Amnesty International's prisoners of conscience were Marine
reservists.85
Prosecuting these men and women achieved a number of goals
for the Marine Corps. It had an obvious "chilling" effect on those
who wished to apply for such a discharge. Second, obtaining crimi-
nal convictions against those who had already filed for conscien-
tious objector discharge rendered the pending applications moot.
In at least five cases, Marines who, against all odds, had received
favorable recommendations by their IOs, had the entire process
mooted when they were court-martialled. 6 And the Marine Corps
does not count such dispositions as denied applications.8 7 Of
course, the Marine Corps refused to hold the court-martials in
abeyance until after the conscientious objector claims had been
processed.
Lastly, by criminalizing as many conscientious objectors as
possible, the Marine Corps was able repeatedly to claim that such
persons were being prosecuted for violating the law, not for their
anti-war beliefs.88 By refusing to recognize the overlap between a
claim of conscientious objection and a refusal to perform duties
that violated the soldier's conscience, the Marine Corps could
maintain the legal fiction that no one was being prosecuted for be-
ing a conscientious objector.89 This, of course, was entirely true.
.. See AI Table, supra note 4 (24 of 32 "prisoners of conscience" were Marine reserv-
ists). Generally, the Army targeted only "high-profile" refuseniks for prosecution. The Navy
and the Air Force, who contributed only tiny numbers of service members, similarly fol-
lowed a policy of getting rid of the dissidents as quickly and quietly as possible.
88 See, e.g., United States v. Summers, No. 593-26-6614 (Piedmont Jud. Cir. Court-
Martial 1991).
8 Telephone Conversation with Captain Robert L. Larsen, Jr., United States Marines
Corp (Feb. 11, 1992).
88 See Applebome, supra note 6, at A14. "A reservist who simply fails to report for duty
falls into a disciplinary category beyond the realm of conscientious objection." Miller, supra
note 20, at 30. "Officials say the men are not being prosecuted for applying for conscientious
objector status." Applebome, supra note 6, at A14. "[S]ince claiming to be a CO or applying
for CO status is not a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, no Marine has been
punished for requesting this status. Only those who violated the UCMJ by deserting or
missing the movement of their units were punished." T.V. Draude, Conscientious Objection,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1991, at A25.
88 See Miller, supra note 20, at 30. The media generally saw through this subterfuge,
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They were prosecuted because they were conscientious objectors.
Such punitive action could only be undertaken if the conscien-
tious objector applicant could be induced to commit a breach of
military law. And before this could happen, the Marine Corps
needed to abolish procedural protections for reservists.
A provision in Marine Corps Order 1306.16E provided that
"[a] Marine reservist who applies for conscientious objector status
will not normally be ordered to involuntary active duty until the
application is resolved."" o The Marine Corps circumvented this Or-
der by maintaining that it did not apply to activation of whole
units, but rather, only to activation of individuals, despite the ab-
sence of such limiting language.91 And, once activated, the Marine
Corps took the position that no incompatibility existed between
such claims and deployment to Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, consci-
entious objector applicants were involuntarily ordered to active
duty and given orders to deploy.2
The results were disastrous. Young reservists confronted with
an imminent call-up faced a terrible dilemma-report as ordered
and be deployed to Saudi Arabia despite their claim of conscien-
tious objection, or violate military law by failing to report on
time.93 In practice, young people were faced with only days or
prompting the Marine Corps to bemoan, in appropriately Orwellian fashion, the media's
confusion. "Unfortunately, the media, largely unfamiliar with the administrative procedures
and military justice, may lump the conscientious objector and the deserter into the same
category. Understanding and endorsing disparate treatment is difficult. Proper dissemina-
tion of accurate information is, therefore, essential." Id.
90 MCO 1306.16E(6)(k) (Nov. 21, 1986).
91 See Lwin v. Cooper, 33 M.J. 666, 667 (N.-M.C.M.R. 1991). The Naval Marine Court
of Military Review ultimately rejected that rationale, but substituted another, finding that
the use of the word "normally" permitted the Marine Corps to activate reservist COs during
Desert Shield/Storm. Id.
92 See Alan C. Miller & Ronald J. Ostrow, Some Fear Civil Liberties May Be Added to
Conflict's Toll, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1991, at A9. Kathy Gilbert, co-chairwoman of the Mili-
tary Law Task Force of the National Lawyers' Guild, claimed that the deployment of con-
scientious objectors to Saudi Arabia placed heavy burdens on COs who could not then "af-
ford to have [their] attorney present or to call witnesses who can corroborate [their] change
in beliefs." Id. The Pentagon contended that it was "necessary to keep applicants with their
units ... because the hearings [were] before [their] unit commanders." Id.
11 Ironically and tragically, the Fourth Marine Division never had any intention of de-
ploying COs to Saudi Arabia. In late November of 1990, a policy was made that such
refuseniks would be kept either at their home base or at one of the Marine bases in the
United States. Having made that sensible policy, the Fourth Marine Division then decided
to keep it a secret, refusing to tell CO applicants what would happen to them. According to
Marine Captain Peter Collins, one of the policy's authors, the purpose of secrecy was to
prevent insincere applications.
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sometimes hours to make such a decision. 4 Dozens of them missed
their reporting dates and sought civilian legal counsel to aid in pre-
paring their conscientious objector claims.9 5 Almost without excep-
tion, these young people were absent for less than one month and
voluntarily surrendered themselves before their units were sent to
the Gulf.
Ordinarily, under the UCMJ, unauthorized absence for under
thirty days is graded as the civilian equivalent of a low-level mis-
demeanor, with a maximum punishment of six months in jail, trial
without a jury by Special Court-Martial, and no punitive dis-
charge.96 The general practice prior to Desert Shield/Storm had
been to avoid any criminal prosecution for such offenses, and to
sentence the offender to nonjudicial punishment involving extra
duties or restricted liberty. That was particularly true when the
soldier was a first-time offender and surrendered himself
voluntarily.
This was not the policy followed with respect to conscientious
objector applicants. Instead, members of the Marine Corps Judge
Advocate General Corps "dusted off some law books,"9 and
charged each such objector with the crime of desertion with intent
to avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service, a felony carry-
ing up to five years in prison. 8 Ironically, the conclusive proof of
the resister's intent to so "shirk" was the conscientious objection
application itself. Thus did the military transubstantiate a petty
offense, of its own creation, into a major felony.
Once the charges were brought, the Marine Corps adamantly
refused to consider a plea to anything but desertion. Indeed, as
time passed and the war was showing signs of great success for
0' Cf. Dix v. Resor, 449 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1971) (deciding Army properly considered
fact that CO application was filed after applicant had been ordered to Vietnam); Rothfuss v.
Resor, 443 F.2d 554, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1971) (although not conclusive, Army may consider
that CO application was submitted on eve of deployment to combat zone).
"' See supra note 71 (discussing soldiers going AWOL in order to properly complete
claims).
" See 10 U.S.C. §§ 856, 886 (1983); UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt.
IV, T 10(e)(2)(b) (1984) [hereinafter COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL].
97 Statement of Captain Russell Primeaux, U.S. Military Corps, to Attorney Ronald L.
Kuby in Jacksonville, N.C. (June 1991). Captain Primeaux and his colleague, Captain Peter
Collins, directed the prosecution of Marine Corps COs under orders from the Staff Judge
Advocate, Colonel Glynn F. Voison, the attorney to Major General M.T. Cooper, former
U.S. Marine Corps Commander, 4th Marine Division.
" See 10 U.S.C. §§ 856, 885(a)(2) (1983); COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 96, at
pt. IV, 9(e)(1).
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U.S. forces, the Marine Corps line hardened.9 9 In December 1990,
for example, the Marine Corps was willing to accept guilty pleas in
exchange for sentences of nine months. By January 1991, the "go-
ing rate" was up to ten months. By April, it had jumped to an
incredible fifteen months, with three extra months added on for
conscientious objectors who had made public statements reported
in the press.' 00
Faced with inflationary jail sentences, isolated at Camp
Lejeune where they were subject to repeated harassment,'0 and
awaiting a trial on a military base, in a military town, by a military
court composed of Marines, most of the Camp Lejeune resisters
pleaded guilty and received jail sentences ranging from eight to
eighteen months. One young corporal who refused to plead guilty
was convicted at trial and sentenced to thirty months, 02 the high-
est sentence imposed on the Gulf resisters.1
0 3
During Desert Shield/Storm, this "zero tolerance" for those
late in reporting was employed exclusively against those who had
applied for CO status. 10 4 Any excuse for missing a reporting date,
other than conscientious objection, was treated with relative leni-
ency. For example, court records at Camp Lejeune reveal that from
11 See Applebome, supra note 6, at A14 (Marines have taken "harder line" with COs);
Murphy, supra note 6, at Al (Marine COs received harsher sentences compared with COs in
other military branches).
10 See Murphy, supra note 6, at Al ("[C]onscientious objectors.., presented a public
relations problem for the Department of Defense.").
See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
102 See AI Table, supra note 4, at col. 4. Most of the Marine prisoners were released
after serving six months in jail. Id. at col. 5.
113 Id. at col. 4. Another resister, Army Captain Yolanda Huet-Vaughn, a medical doc-
tor, received a 30-month sentence following court-martial for refusing orders to the Gulf.
She was released after serving nine months in jail.
Two of the young men who reported late did so after January 16, 1991, after the formal
commencement of hostilities. The Marine Corps declared its intention to prosecute them for
desertion in time of war-an offense punishable by death. See Applebome, supra note 6, at
A14. The Marine prosecutor did his bit for deterrence by refusing to rule out the possibility
that the defendants would be executed. See id.
104 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 51.
Now, after dozens of courts-martial, it's clear that G.I.s who went temporarily
AWOL during Desert Storm for purely private reasons-who went on lengthy
drinking sprees, who covertly traveled home from bases in Germany, who simply
vanished from their units without word or explanation-generally received mini-
mal punishment and often were simply discharged. Prosecution and lengthy
prison terms have most often been reserved for those who went AWOL after their
C.O. claims were denied or discouraged, or who stood publicly against the war.
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January 3, 1991 through May 25, 1991, fifty non-conscientious ob-
jector Marines were prosecuted for missing their reporting dates. 10 5
Of these, many were absent for months, rather than the few days
typical for the conscientious objectors. Some had been appre-
hended; the conscientious objectors almost always surrendered
themselves. Furthermore, of the fifty, not one was charged with
desertion and not one was referred to a general court-martial. The
average jail sentence imposed was approximately eleven weeks, as
opposed to the twelve-month average for Marine conscientious ob-
jectors. Finally, of the fifty, twenty-eight received Bad Conduct
Discharges, and not one was discharged dishonorably. Every
Marine conscientious objector who was prosecuted received either
a Bad Conduct Discharge or a Dishonorable Discharge.
C. Retention on Active Duty for Those Who Refuse To Re-
nounce Their Beliefs
Even after the war ended, the Marine Corps placed one final
hurdle in the paths of those who applied for CO status. The Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps directed that all Marines who had
outstanding conscientious objector applications would "be retained
on active duty ... until the application has reached the appropri-
ate commanding general."'1 6 The stated purpose of this order was
to "expedite" the determination as to whether these reservists
would be available "in the event of future national emergency.' 0 7
In other words, those who objected the most to military service
would be kept in service the longest, in case of a future war.
However, the Marine Corps provided a loophole-an applicant
who withdrew his CO application and repudiated his beliefs would
be able to take his gear and go home. This transparent attempt to
bribe sincere young people to withdraw their conscientious objec-
tor claims spoke volumes on how the Marine Corps viewed CO ap-
plicants and its own obligations to process applications. Fortu-
nately, the young people affected by this order once again proved
to be far more resolute in their beliefs than the Marine Corps an-
ticipated. Not a single objector accepted the deal.
... In many, perhaps most cases, no prosecution was undertaken. Criminal charges were
brought against only the most egregious offenders, and, of course, the COs.




D. Humiliation, Threats, and Beatings
During the court-martial of Sergeant Bobbitt, Gunnery Ser-
geant Bret Alan Wurdinger testified that he identified the consci-
entious objectors at Camp Lejeune to the other Marines stationed
there after ordering the COs to remain anonymous.
Q. When [the conscientious objectors] arrived on January 3,
1991, did you tell them... that they should not talk to anybody
[at Camp Lejeune] about their conscientious objector status be-
cause they might be beaten up?
A. Yes, sir, for their own safety.
Q. During the first week of January, 1991, do you recall a
time when you had a conversation with some Recon Marines in
Recon barracks?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And in fact, [the conscientious objectors] were involved in
a working party in that barracks?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had told the Recon Marines prior to the time
they arrived for that working party that these were the conscien-
tious objector/deserters?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think there may have been a physical safety prob-
lem with that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see any discrepancy between telling [the conscien-
tious objectors] not to tell anybody they were conscientious objec-
tors ... and you telling everybody that they were conscientious
objectors/deserters? Did you see any possible discrepancy be-
tween those two situations?
A. No, sir. 08
The testimony of Colonel J.D. Robinson provides further confusion
regarding the Marine Corps' steps to preserve the safety of COs.
Q. So you had a [threatening] letter that was purportedly
written... by two Marines, and you felt that [the conscientious
objectors] would be safer here on the Marine base than they
would be say, in Georgia, on leave?
A. That's correct.
Q. Or in surrounding states?
1 Test. of Gunnery Sergeant Bret Alan Wurdinger, U.S. Marine Corps, United States
v. Bobbitt, No. 100-64-9752 (Piedmont Jud. Cir. Court Martial 1991). In the argot of the
Marine Corps, Reconnaissance Marines are reputed to be the toughest and most gung-ho.
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A. Exactly.
Q. Where nobody knew who they were?
A. Well, the bottom line you have to realize is I am responsi-
ble for their safety . .. ."I
The military legal system proved to be the most potent and
useful tool to intimidate and punish conscientious objectors. On a
day-to-day level, however, the individual resister faced pervasive,
extra-judicial reprisals from colleagues, staff non-commissioned of-
ficers, and, occasionally, from commissioned officers. These extra-
judicial reprisals comprised verbal abuse, name-calling, degrading
and humiliating treatment, threats, and, occasionally, actual physi-
cal violence.
The most systematic harassment took place at Camp
Lejeune.110 In mid-December 1990, the Marine Corps decided to
order all those objectors facing possible disciplinary charges to go
to Camp Lejeune. This assignment effectively isolated them from
their families, friends, supporters, attorneys, and the press. Upon
their arrival at Camp LeJeune, they were placed in a special unit
under the direct and daily control of officers who were openly hos-
tile to the resisters."
This harassment was documented in a series of evidentiary
hearings held during court-martial proceedings." 2 The Marine
Corps' own court found that "there were ... repeated instances of
intentional harassment and punishment of [the COs] by their Staff
Noncommissioned Officer in Charge due solely to their status as
conscientious objectors.""' This included referring to the conscien-
tious objectors as "deserters, cowards, and other derogatory term
[sic], both individually and as a group," both publicly and pri-
vately; deliberately imperiling the physical safety of the COs by
instigating confrontations between them and other marines; and
harassing and punishing them by assigning extra duties, dumping
trash into their barracks, "pre-failing" inspections, forcing them to
"dress and undress repeatedly," and do push-ups "as punishment
:09 Test. of Colonel J.D. Robinson, U.S. Marine Corps, Bobbitt, No. 100-64-9752.
"o See supra notes 6, 20 and accompanying text.
III The Marines denied the existence of any form of systematic or organized harass-
ment, or that they were actively seeking harsher sentences for COs. See Applebome, supra
note 6, at A14.
:12 See Summers Stipulation, supra note 20, at 1-4.
,3 Id. at 4.
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for no apparent reason.' 1 14 All of this mistreatment was done "to
intentionally create a boot-camp atmosphere . . . solely [due] to
their status as conscientious objectors.""' 5
In addition, the Lejeune resisters were restricted to the base,
whereas all other Marines were free to go into town in the evenings
and to take weekend liberty outside the state."18 Moreover, the re-
sisters were given strict curfews that confined them to their bar-
racks. 11 The stated basis for these restrictions was the fact that
the parents of one resister had received a threat, purportedly au-
thored by two Marines, calling them "traitors" and informing them
that the authors knew where they were."' The "threat" was never
investigated and eventually was determined to be groundless." 9
The court acknowledged that "[o]nce it was determined that a
threat no longer existed, there was no rational basis for continuing
any restrictions. The restrictions increased, if anything. The har-
assment and punishment continued." 20
Despite these findings, not a single member of the Marine
Corps was subject to any disciplinary action for mistreating the
conscientious objectors. The failure of the Marine command to
take any action against these malefactors sent the clearest possible
signal that this illegal treatment and abuse were condoned at the
highest level of command.
The only concern displayed by the Marine Corps with respect
to its unlawful treatment of conscientious objectors was bad pub-
licity. A recent award-winning essay in the Marine Corps Gazette
warned that "[c]ommanders who seek to punish conscientious ob-
jectors court unnecessary and perhaps unfavorable media atten-
tion.'"' "Such attention may have a significant impact on the mo-
rale of their unit and ... the commander."' 2 The fact that such
mistreatment is a crime under military law suggested a conse-
quence so remote that to mention it simply would have cluttered
up the page.
:14 Id. at 3.
15 Id.
11o Id. at 1.
117 Id.
18 Id. at 2.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 4.
1 Miller, supra note 20, at 29.
122 Id.
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V. RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW
One year after the war's end, it is hard to find anyone, civilian
or military, who is satisfied with the functioning of the CO system
during the war. 123From Amnesty International to the General Ac-
counting Office, reviews are under way to evaluate the treatment of
conscientious objectors and make proposals for change. 124
The most positive development is a bill, submitted to the
House of Representatives on May 5, 1992, entitled the Military
Conscientious Objector Act of 1992 (the "Act").' 25 Drafted by the
Honorable Ronald V. Dellums (D-Cal.), Chair of the House Sub-
committee on the Armed Forces, the proposed legislation would
amend title 10 of the United States Code to reflect the lessons of
the Gulf War. The Bill represents a profound overhauling of the
present system. In a clear and concise manner, it provides proce-
dures for CO applicants and specific parameters for the military.
The Act would, for the first time, recognize "selective objec-
tion" as a basis for discharge. 2 6 The present draft provides CO
status to one who objects to all war or "to participation in a partic-
ular conflict.' 127 Thus would the "just war" doctrine be incorpo-
rated into modern law. 28
Procedurally, the Act will revamp and streamline the entire
CO process. Recognizing the military's superior access to informa-
tion and investigative resources, the burden of proof has been real-
located to the military. 29 The burden must be carried by clear and
22 See Applebome, supra note 6, at A14. Military officials and personnel were skeptical
of the timing of the CO applications on the eve of combat. See id. Accordingly, members of
the armed forces were unhappy with a system that permitted desertion in the name of reli-
gious or ethical convictions. See id. Particularly, the Marines, considering themselves
"ready," "tough," and "strong," could not understand why someone would join the Corps
other than to serve and fight. See Murphy, supra note 6, at Al.
124 See Al Table, supra note 4. "[C]onscientious objectors made headlines when they
were designated 'prisoners of conscience' by the human rights organization Amnesty Inter-
national, which usually reserves such designations for captives of repressive regimes." Mur-
phy, supra note 6, at Al; see also H.R. 5060, supra note 55 (proposing changes to proce-
dures for processing CO applications). See generally Matthew Lippman, The Recognition of
Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right, 21 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 31 (1990) (discussing conscientious objection as international human right).
12 H.R. 5060, supra note 55.
12 Id. § 2(a)(1) (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(c)).
127 Id.
128 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
129 H.R. 5060, supra note 55, § 2(a)(1) (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of §
1057(e)). Upon submission of a proper application for discharge, "the burden of proof that




The Act would retain the current system of psychiatric report,
chaplain's interview, and Investigating Officer hearing. To expedite
the process, however, a favorable recommendation by the 10 con-
stitutes approval, "and the applicant shall be discharged as rapidly
as possible.' 13' A time limit between hearing and decision is to be
set forth.
If the 1O recommends that the application be denied, the ap-
plication is then forwarded to an Adjudication Panel, the decision
of which shall be final. 3 2 To insure fairness in this appellate pro-
cess, only one member of the three-person panel is to come from
the military. 33 The other two members are to be a "civilian who is
a member of the clergy or is trained in the disciplines of ethics or
morality" and a "civilian attorney who is an administrative law
judge" who acts as the Chair of the panel.3 Furthermore, the Ad-
judication Panel also will have a specific time limit to render its
decision. 35
The Act will also provide badly-needed safeguards to prevent
retribution against the applicant. Upon the filing of a Notice of
Intent'36 to claim CO status, the applicant "shall be relieved from
any duties involving the handling, training, and shipment of weap-
ons and ammunition and shall be assigned duties that conflict as
little as possible with the applicant's stated beliefs.' 37 More im-
portantly, filing a Notice of Intent prevents deployment of the ap-
plicant: (1) if the Notice is filed at the member's home site, the
member must be retained there until the application is finally de-
cided; (2) a member who files while away from his or her home site
has an opportunity to be sent back home; (3) if the applicant is not
on active duty when he or she files, the member may not be acti-
vated until the application is finally decided.38 To prevent the ser-
forces." Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(g)(3)).
132 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 by adding § 1057(g)(4), (h)(6)).
133 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(h)(2), (3)).
134 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(h)(2)(B)).
135 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 by adding § 1057(h)(6)).
1:36 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(e)). A Notice of Intent is a
simple statement by the putative applicant informing the military that he or she is a consci-
entious objector and requesting formal application materials. Id.
137 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(e)(2)).
138 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(e)(3)(A)-(B), (4)).
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vicemember from blundering into breaches of military law-out of
ignorance or fear-the military is required to provide legal counsel
and assistance to the applicant from the preparation of the Notice
of Intent until the application is finally decided."' s
Lastly, the Bill protects the rights of those servicemembers
who, because of conscientious objection, run afoul of military au-
thorities. None of the information collected during the CO process
can be used against the servicemember. 140 A member who faces a
charge arising "out of the member's objection to participation in
war" has the right to have the court-martial proceedings held in
abeyance until after the CO proceedings are decided.14 1 If the ap-
plication is granted, the charges must be dismissed.142 If the appli-
cation is denied, the military may then proceed with a court-
martial.143
VI. CONCLUSION
One year after the Gulf War, Kuwait remains ruled by a feu-
dal monarchy composed of a single family. Hundreds of thousands
of Iraqis are dead, including uncounted civilians. United States air
power destroyed the infrastructure of an entire nation. Everyday,
Iraqi children die as a consequence. Whether this destruction is
the "fault" of Saddam Hussein, or of a dying empire flexing its last
muscles in imperial conquest, is a conclusion to be drawn by his-
torians yet unborn. Whether the war was "just" similarly awaits
the verdict of future scholars and theologians. But surely the
young people who refused to partake in the killing are entitled to
more than drumhead tribunals headed by the same people who
prosecuted the war. The military victory belongs to the U.S.
Armed Forces, but the rule of law was lost in the winds of Desert
Storm.
"I Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(e)(7)).
140 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(h)(6)).
"' Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(i)(1)).
:42 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(i)(2)).
13 Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(i)(3)). Such cases should be
rare indeed, given the procedural guarantees elsewhere in the bill. In addition, the bill
would guarantee all COs who comply with the Act an honorable discharge "with all rights,
benefits, and privileges." Id. (proposing to amend title 10 with addition of § 1057(k)). This
change is significant because under current law, the government may forfeit a CO's right to
Servicemen's Group Life Insurance. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1910, 1972 (1988).
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